Swiss set to retire all A220-100s by the end of 2027
A Swiss A220-100 on final approach to Geneva. Photo credit.
The shrink curse has finally arrived to the Airbus A220. What was initially a temporary solution to engine durability issues ended up becoming permanent. Swiss announced it would ground all of its A220-100s in late 2025 as a stopgap measure to keep their larger A220-300s in operation. A few of them have remained in operation, however, following the latest quarterly results published by Lufthansa Group, it has been determined that the A220-100 is no longer a fit for the group’s medium and long term future strategy.
A retirement long in the drawing
Swiss originally ordered 30 CS100s to replace their aging RJ100 fleet. Photo credit.
In early 2009, Lufthansa group signed a contract with Bombardier, placing a major order for 30 CS100 aircraft, which were expected to join the fleet of Switzerland’s flag carrier, Swiss International Airlines. The objective of the CSeries order was a brand new and super efficient replacement for the airline’s aging fleet of 20 Avro RJ100s. In this original contract, it was also stated that up to 20 of those could be converted to the larger CS300 if the airline so desired.
It is worth pointing out that even the smaller CS100 can fit more seats than the RJ100, the largest of the Avro RJ variants. In Swiss’ case, their RJ100s were fitted with 97 seats, while the CS100s would be fitted with 125.
Trouble for the CS100 would begin at the drawing boards in Mirabel: Bombardier envisioned the CS300 as the base variant of the family, with the CS100 being a simple shrink of the base -300. It is a well known fact that simple shrinks are inherently less efficient than the base aircraft they’re shrunk from, and the CS100 was no exception. Due to the amount of cutting edge technologies put into the platform, the program quickly began to run over budget, as well as being significantly delayed.
Seeing all of this unfold, as well as realizing both variants of the aircraft were being developed roughly in parallel, and, therefore, certification for both would come roughly at the same time, Swiss converted 10 orders into the larger CS300 model, featuring an additional 20 seats. At the time Swiss’ Chief Executive Officer, Harry Hohmeister, stated: “With both versions of the new CSeries in our ranks, we can be highly flexible in tailoring capacity to demand on our European routes.” It was expected that 10 CS100s would be delivered in 2016. The 10 CS300s would join the fleet starting in early 2017.
Deliveries begin, and plans change yet again
Despite their initial order for 30 CS100s, only nine would ever be delivered. The other 21 were converted to the larger, more efficient CS300. Photo credit.
The first CS100 would be delivered to Swiss in June 2016, making the airline the world’s launch customer for the CSeries family. In the end, 5 CS100s entered service in 2016, with 3 more following in early 2017. What followed was a massive change of direction: through the remainder of 2017, 7 of the larger CS300s would follow. In 2018, an additional 13 CS300s would be delivered to the airline, with no CS100 deliveries logged the entire year. In the middle of 2018, Bombardier could no longer keep up with the costs of the CSeries program, and sold a majority stake to Airbus, which renamed the family to A220.
Deliveries were stale in the first half of 2019. After 6 months of no new A220 additions, and over 2 years since the 8th CS100 was delivered, HB-JBI was delivered to Swiss in July 2019. As a fun fact, this is the only “actual” A220-100 in Swiss’ fleet, as all other 8 were delivered by Bombardier, and are technically CS100s. This would be the last A220 delivery for a very long time, with the last of the 30 aircraft ordered being delivered only in May 2021, and it was an A220-300. This totals to 9 CS100s/A220-100s and 21 CS300s/A220-300s in Swiss’ fleet.
The disadvantages of a shrink
The Airbus A318 is a noteworthy example of the disadvantages brought by the simple shrinking of an airframe, only selling 80 units. Photo credit.
It is important to discuss a few characteristics of the A220-100 before we proceed. Although it was the first variant to fly, and to enter service, upon further analysis, it becomes obvious that it was never the primary focus of Bombardier’s grand vision for the CSeries project.
The initial purpose of the then CSeries was to fill a very specific gap in the market: Something larger than a regional jet, like the E175, but smaller than the typical narrowbody, such as the A320 and 737-800. This project was supposed to replace DC-9s, MD-80s, 737 Classics and Fokker 100s, as well as compete with the Boeing 717 and the smaller end of the 737NG and A320 families. To acheive this, two variants would be planned: the smaller CS100, to replace the DC-9, Fokker 100 and 737-500, and compete with the 717, 737-600 and A318; and the larger CS300, to replace the MD-80, 737-300 and compete with the 737-700 and A319.
The question then was what should the base variant be. Determining the base variant is a crucial step in an airliner’s development, as all components, weights, dimensions and power will usually be optimized for the base variant. The answer to this question would implicitly come from Airbus, which has stated many times that “a stretched A220 is a matter of time”, and stabilizing the program’s finances. This implies that Bombardier may have also planned for an even larger variant of the aircraft, the CS500, to try to tap on the market filled by the incredibly popular 737-800 and A320, should the program be a success.
Generally, both stretching and shrinking come with performance penalties. Make it double, and you set yourself for a disaster, as seen with the A318, a double shrink of the A320, or the 737 MAX 10, a double-stretch of the base MAX 8, which, while a decent aircraft with lots of orders, is far from being a “true” competitor to the A321neo, especially the longer-range variants. If a 3-variant family was indeed always Bombardier’s grand plan, it makes the most sense to optimize the design around the midsized variant, and deal with the performance penalties of a single shrink/stretch, rather than doing it double and ending up with a completely deoptimized variant. Therefore, it makes a lot more sense to base the family around the CS300, and simply shrink it a few meters to make the CS100.
Although both stretching and shrinking come with performance penalties, shrinks are generally affected much more disfavorably than stretches, and any alternative designed with the size of the shrunk variant in mind is far more attractive. The A220 proves both ends of this spectrum: the base A220-300 is a massive sales success, taking away most of the relevance of the 737 MAX 7, and completely cannibalizing the A319neo, rumored to be discontinued in the not so distant future. The A220-100, on the other hand, has been a flop. Part of the reason is the CS300 itself, which shares the same type-rating, maintenance procedures and almost identical operating costs, but being capable of carrying 20 more passengers in Swiss’ case. The other factor making the CS100 virtually irrelevant is the Embraer E195-E2.
The Embraer dilemma
The Embraer E195-E2 can do almost everything the A220-100 does, but is significantly lighter and more efficient.Photo credit.
The one advantage the A220-100 has over the A220-300 is its raw performance. The oversized wings and overpowered engines give the shrunk variant exceptional short field performance, making it the only variant of the A220 capable of operating at London City Airport, one of the trickiest airports in the world, with a very short runway and unique steep approach. In the 2000s, Avro RJs reigned supreme at the airport, with Swiss being no exception to bring their Avros there.
As the 2010s inched closer, it was time to replace the Avros, and Swiss chose the CSeries for this mission. The larger CS300 would take care of the core intra-Europe flights, while the CS100 primarily took care of the London City flights, although they could be seen all over Europe as well. However, the CSeries was not the route most airlines chose, instead going for the already certified Embraer E-Jets family.
Helvetic is another Swiss airline, which started operations with a fleet of Fokker 100s. At first, this may seem completely unrelated, as the Fokker 100s couldn’t operate at London City. That is until those Fokkers got old and needed a replacement. What aircraft did Helvetic acquire to replace their Fokkers? Second-hand E190s, which were certified to operate at London City if given the necessary modifications.
Through the 2010s, Helvetic established important partnerships with the Lufthansa Group, especially with Swiss, to the point where a passenger could book a Swiss flight, but board a Helvetic plane. This diluted the demand for a big fleet of London City-certified A220-100s on Swiss’ behalf to fully replace the Avros, as part of the traffic could be funneled to Helvetic’s E190s.
Another huge hit for Swiss’ A220-100s came in Sepetember 2018, when Helvetic ordered 12 Embraer E190-E2s. In the end, four of those would be converted to the larger E195-E2. This is terrible news for the A220-100, as the E195-E2 has virtually the same size as the A220-100, but being significantly lighter and more well-optimized. It is also worth noting that the smaller E190s and E190-E2s are about the same size as the RJ100s that Swiss was getting rid of.
The big blows coming from Embraer were still to come. Since April 2017, the A220-100 was the only next-generation aircraft certified to operate at London City. That changed in May 2021, when EASA certified the E190-E2 for London City operations. Crucially, in November 2023, the larger E195-E2 was also granted the same certification. In March 2025, Helvetic started E195-E2 operations at London City, with E190 operations having started in 2022, significantly reducing the demand for Swiss A220-100 flights to the airport, partly stripping the aircraft of its most important role.
The spark that set everything on fire
One of Swiss’ A220-300s grounded due to premature engine wear and supply chain delays. Photo credit.
As advanced as the CSeries was, it had a crucial flaw. The engines selected to power the aircraft were Pratt & Whitney PW1500G geared turbofans. A super advanced engine, with an extremely high bypass ratio, and a cutting-edge gearbox to reduce the fan’s speed, something which had never been done to engines of this thrust class.
Unfortunately for Pratt & Whitney, supply chain issues brought poor quality powdered metal to their factories. This deffective material has been a huge source of trouble not only for the A220, but every aircraft powered by PW1000G family engines, causing unexpectedly quick engine degradation, reducing their time-on-wing, and increasing maintenance and replacement frequency. Although the engines also power the A320neo family and the Embraer E2 family, these two families have each important caveats that the A220 doesn’t.
For the A320neo, it’s Airbus’ insane amount of money, which allowed them to offer a second engine choice for the A320neo family, the CFM LEAP, which hasn’t had nearly as much trouble. Bombardier simply did not have the money to convince someone else to offer an alternative engine option for the CSeries. As for the E2, caveat number 1 is that they’re newer than the A220, especially in Swiss’ and Helvetic’s case. The powdered metal issue affected early-production engines the hardest (though the issue wouldn’t be fully resolved until nearly a decade later). Caveat number 2 is that the E2 uses virtually the same engine as the A220, but because the E2 is significantly lighter than the Canadian competitor, their engines naturally suffer from much less wear, as they require much less power than the A220 in most circumstances, effectively cancelling out the quick degradation of the powdered metal.
This resulted in total disaster for the A220, with sources claiming that nearly 20% of the entire global A220 fleet was simultaneously grounded in 2025, solely because there were no suitable engines. The Lufthansa Group 2025 annual report stated that between 4 and 5 A220s were grounded at any given time due to unexpectedly early engine issues. With the situation seeing no sign of improving in 2026, the decision was made to gradually park the entire fleet of A220-100s to maximize availability of the more valuable A220-300 fleet. Initially, it was planned that the A220-100 fleet would be grounded for at least 18 months. Although some airframes still remain flying, Swiss has gone to the extreme route of retiring and scrapping two A220-100s, both less than 10 years old, as it deemed the value of their parts to keep A220-300s flying greater than a potential re-entry into service.
As the A220-100s were grounded, Swiss realized that the aircraft were a bit of a burden. For the non-London City routes, the A220-300s are far more profitable than the A220-100 with their additional 20 seats, while their partnership with Helvetic guarantees their presence at London City. This leaves virtually no place for the A220-100, leading up to the announcement that the A220-100 grounding would go from temporary to permanent.
References
SWISS To Retire Entire A220-100 Fleet Just 10 Years After Launching It
SWISS moves toward permanent Airbus A220-100 retirement - Air Data News
Lufthansa Board Approves Order for 30 Bombardier CSeries
SWISS converts ten Bombardier CSeries aircraft orders from the CS100 to the CS300
Helvetic Airways welcomes its first Embraer E190-E2 | Helvetic Airways
London City Airport certified by EASA for Embraer E190-E2. In important
Embraer’s E195-E2 Receives Steep Approach Certification for London City Airport Operations
Nearly One in Five Airbus A220s Grounded Worldwide as Engine Crisis Deepens | AirMag.aero
Aviation Photos, Airline Fleets & more | Planespotters.net | Planespotters.net
